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On strike insurance

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  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Schnabel, Claus

Abstract

A strike insurance is integrated into a model based on one-sided private information of the firm. It is shown that the strike insurance will increase the dispute level if payments to the insurance are lump-sum or if payments from the insurance are proportional to wages. However, if wages affect contributions or if firms receive lump-sum transfers in the case of a dispute, strike activity will fall. Information on the extent of employer strike funds and union strike pay in 16 OECD countries is used to test whether their existence influences strike volume. Regression analyses for the period 1970 to 1996 and for three sub-periods show that while the existence of union strike pay schemes tends to reduce strike volume, countries with strike funds provided by employers' peak confederations are characterised by more strike activity. -- Ein Streikmodell mit privater Information eines Unternehmens wird um eine Streikversicherung ergänzt. Es wird gezeigt, dass eine Streikversicherung zu mehr Arbeitskämpfen führt, wenn die Beiträge an die Versicherung eine Pauschale darstellen oder die Leistungen von der Versicherung lohnbezogen sind. Sind jedoch die Beiträge lohnbezogen oder die Leistungen der Versicherung pauschal ausgestaltet, so wird die Streikaktivität geringer. Informationen über unternehmerische Streikversicherungen und gewerkschaftliches Streikgeld für 16 OECD Länder werden genutzt, um den Einfluss dieser Institutionen auf das Streikvolumen zu testen. Die Regressionsergebnisse für den Zeitraum 1970 bis 1996 und für drei Teilperioden zeigen, dass Länder mit unternehmerischen Streikversicherungen auf der obersten Verbandsebene durch mehr Streikaktivität gekennzeichnet sind, während die Existenz von gewerkschaftlichem Streikgeld das Streikvolumen reduziert.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 12.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:faulre:12

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Web page: http://www.arbeitsmarkt.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/english-version/
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Related research

Keywords: Asymmetric information; employer strike insurance; OECD; strike pay;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Schank, Thorsten & Schnabel, Claus, 2004. "Betriebliche Determinanten des Überstundeneinsatzes," Discussion Papers 24, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
  2. Haltiwanger, John & Jarmin, Ron & Schank, Thorsten, 2003. "Productivity, investment in ICT and market experimentation: micro evidence from Germany und the US," Discussion Papers 19, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
  3. Zagelmeyer, Stefan, 2003. "Die Entwicklung kollektiver Verhandlungen in Großbritannien: ein historischer Überblick," Discussion Papers 17, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
  4. Kohaut, Susanne & Schnabel, Claus, 2003. "Verbreitung, Ausmaß und Determinanten der übertariflichen Entlohnung," Discussion Papers 23, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
  5. Knabe, Andreas, 2009. "Implementing endogenous inside options in Nash wage bargaining models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 161-176, March.
  6. Niederalt, Michael, 2003. "Betriebliche Ausbildung als kollektives Phänomen," Discussion Papers 20, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.

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