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A Signaling Model Of Competitive Political Pressures

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  • Susanne Lohmann
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    Abstract

    This paper models competitive political pressures as a signaling phenomenon. People participate in collective action in support of or against the status quo, or they abstain. Their actions and abstentions inform the decision of a policymaker who may overturn the status quo in favor of a policy alternative. By providing an informational microfoundation for the widely used reduced-form "pressure production functions" and "political influence functions," the analysis allows me to reexamine the role of the free rider problem in creating a bias towards vocal special interests. Copyright 1995 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics & Politics.

    Volume (Year): 7 (1995)
    Issue (Month): 3 (November)
    Pages: 181-206

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:7:y:1995:i:3:p:181-206

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    Cited by:
    1. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-31, February.
    2. Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006. "Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure," Working Papers 06.14, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    3. Randolph Sloof & Frans van Winden, 2000. "Show Them Your Teeth First!," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 81-120, July.
    4. Reuben E., 2002. "Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation," Public Economics 0212001, EconWPA.
    5. Ezra Friedman, 1998. "Public Debate Among Experts," Discussion Papers 1234, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Derek Pyne, 1997. "Microfoundations of Influencing Public Opinion Lobbying and Voting for Trade Policies," Working Papers 1997_03, York University, Department of Economics.
    7. Sayer, Stuart, 2000. " Issues in New Political Economy: An Overview," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 513-26, December.

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