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Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of business and environmental interest groups in the European Union

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  • Gullberg, Anne Therese
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    Abstract

    Drawing on two conflicting hypotheses from the theoretical literature on lobbying, I consider the strategies applied by interest groups lobbying to influence climate policy in the European Union (EU). The first hypothesis claims that interest groups lobby their 'friends', decision-makers with positions similar to their own. The second claims that interest groups lobby their 'foes', decision-makers with positions opposed to their own. Using interviews with lobbyists and decision-makers, I demonstrate that in the field of climate policy, interest groups in the EU lobby both friends and foes, but under different conditions. Moreover, I find that the interest groups' motives are not always in line with the theoretical hypotheses. Interest groups lobby their friends on single policy decisions to exchange information, to further a common cause and to exert pressure, and their foes because a foe on one issue might prove to be a friend on another issue. Interest groups direct general lobbying towards both friends and foes. This paper provides a new empirical contribution to a literature that has so far been heavily dominated by studies focusing on lobbying in the US.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Energy Policy.

    Volume (Year): 36 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 8 (August)
    Pages: 2954-2962

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:36:y:2008:i:8:p:2954-2962

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

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    1. Markussen, Peter & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2005. "Industry lobbying and the political economy of GHG trade in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 245-255, January.
    2. Beate Kohler-Koch & Christine Quittkat, 1999. "Intermediation of Interests in the European Union," MZES Working Papers, MZES 9, MZES.
    3. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. " Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-92, October.
    4. Potters, Jan & Van Winden, Frans, 1990. "Modelling political pressure as transmission of information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 61-88, August.
    5. Randolph Sloof & Frans van Winden, 2000. "Show Them Your Teeth First!," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 81-120, July.
    6. Pieter Bouwen, 2004. "The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 473-495, 09.
    7. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    8. Axel Michaelowa, 1998. "Climate policy and interest Groups—A Public choice analysis," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer, Springer, vol. 33(6), pages 251-259, November.
    9. Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 1999. " U.S. Interest Groups Prefer Emission Trading: A New Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 101(1-2), pages 109-28, October.
    10. Anne Gullberg, 2008. "Rational lobbying and EU climate policy," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 161-178, June.
    11. Christophe Crombez, 2002. "Information, Lobbying and the Legislative Process in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 3(1), pages 7-32, March.
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    Cited by:
    1. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00881145 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Sven Rudolph & Friedrich Schneider, 2011. "Did the Japanese Patient Follow the Doctor's Orders? Mostly no! A Public Choice Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Schemes in Japan before and after the Earthquake," CESifo Working Paper Series 3639, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. FORSTER, Manuel & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2013. "Trust and manipulation in social networks," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2013050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Katharina Rietig, 2011. "Public pressure versus lobbying – how do Environmental NGOs matter most in climate negotiations?," Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Papers, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment 70, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.

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