An independent judiciary faces the problem of how to restrain high-court judges from indulging their personal whims. One restraint is the desire of judges to influence future judges. To do so, judges may have to maintain their own or the system's legitimacy by restraining their own behavior. This situation can be viewed as an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game. Such a game has many equilibria, some of which are Pareto superior to others. In some equilibria, self-interested judges are responsible even without the threat of external penalties. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.
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