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Careerist Judges

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  • Levy, Gilat

Abstract

In this Paper I analyse how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations, as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court?s decision reveals whether the judge interpreted properly the law and allows the evaluator to assess the judge?s ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends on the judge?s decision. I find that judges with career concerns tend to inefficiently contradict previous decisions. I also show that such judges behave more efficiently when elected by the public than when appointed by fellow superior judges.

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  • Levy, Gilat, 2003. "Careerist Judges," CEPR Discussion Papers 3948, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3948
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    Cited by:

    1. Turkay, Evsen, 2011. "Evidence disclosure and severity of punishments," MPRA Paper 31504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Idrisov Georgy & Gordeev Dmitry, 2017. "Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Natural Gas Pricing in Domestic and Foreign Markets: The Case of Russia," Working Papers wpaper-2017-274, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2017.
    3. Levy, Gilat, 2004. "Anti-herding and strategic consultation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 503-525, June.
    4. Anderlini Luca & Felli Leonardo & Postlewaite Andrew, 2011. "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 14-28, February.
    5. Hefeker, Carsten & Neugart, Michael, 2010. "Labor market regulation and the legal system," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 218-225, September.
    6. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
    7. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2009. "Multiple equilibria in a firing game with impartial justice," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 262-271, June.
    8. Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni & Luca Anderlini, 2007. "Statute Law or Case Law?," 2007 Meeting Papers 952, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Bertrand Chopard & Edwige Marion & Ludivine Roussey, 2014. "Does the Appeals Process Lower the Occurrence of Legal Errors?," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-43, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    10. Aspasia Tsaoussi & Eleni Zervogianni, 2010. "Judges as satisficers: a law and economics perspective on judicial liability," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 333-357, June.
    11. Clare Leaver & Jordi Blances i Vidal, 2007. "Behaviour in Networks of Collaborators: Theory and Evidence from the English Judiciary," Economics Series Working Papers 354, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    12. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni, 2014. "Why Stare Decisis?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 17(4), pages 726-738, October.
    13. Miguel Santolino & Magnus Söderberg, 2011. "The influence of decision-maker effort and case complexity on appealed rulings subject to multi-categorical selection," IREA Working Papers 201115, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Sep 2011.
    14. Berger, Helge & Neugart, Michael, 2011. "Labor courts, nomination bias, and unemployment in Germany," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 659-673.
    15. Giuseppe Vita, 2012. "Normative complexity and the length of administrative disputes: evidence from Italian regions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 197-213, August.
    16. Steven Shavell, 2004. "The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives," NBER Working Papers 10754, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Braz Camargo, 2011. "Career Concerns: A Human Capital Perspective," 2011 Meeting Papers 1274, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    18. Nathan Foley-Fisher, 2012. "The timing of sovereign defaults over electoral terms," International Finance Discussion Papers 1047, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    19. Virginia Rosales-López, 2008. "Economics of court performance: an empirical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 231-251, June.
    20. Hadfield, Gillian K., 2008. "The levers of legal design: Institutional determinants of the quality of law," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 43-73, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Career concerns; Judicial decision-making;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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