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Does the Appeals Process Lower the Occurrence of Legal Errors?

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Listed:
  • Bertrand Chopard
  • Edwige Marion
  • Ludivine Roussey

Abstract

This paper challenges the commonly held idea that the appeals process lowers the occurrence of legal errors. We show that, even if incorporating the right to bring an appeal in criminal adjudication directly offers the opportunity to correct mistakes made at trial, the nal impact on the appeals process on the accuracy of judicial decisions is ambiguous because of its effect through trial court decision-makerse's effort and crime deterrence. We nd out that according to (i) whether trial court decision-makers are rather reputation-concerned or socially-motivated, (ii) the distribution of the population of potential offenders and (iii) the marginal effecf of decision-makers'effort on the probability of wrongful conviction compared to wrongful acquittal, implementing an appeals process may spur decision-makers to reduce their effort and thus be detrimental to the accuracy of legal decisions. We show that this result is true whether an appeal can be brought both after an acquittal or a conviction at trial, or the right to bring an appeal is limited by double jeopardy.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Chopard & Edwige Marion & Ludivine Roussey, 2014. "Does the Appeals Process Lower the Occurrence of Legal Errors?," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-43, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-43
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven Shavell, 2010. "On the Design of the Appeals Process: The Optimal Use of Discretionary Review versus Direct Appeal," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 63-108, January.
    2. Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2012. "Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 311-338.
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    4. Png, I. P. L., 1986. "Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 101-105, June.
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    7. Nuno Garoupa & Matteo Rizzolli, 2012. "Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(2), pages 224-231, June.
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    9. Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, 2013. "Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 395-411, June.
    10. Elisabetta Iossa & Giuliana Palumbo, 2007. "Information Provision and Monitoring of the Decision-Maker in the Presence of an Appeal Process," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(4), pages 657-682, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    appeals; legal errors; crime deterrence.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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