Settlements and Appeals in the European Commission’s Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-017-9572-1
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- Michael Hellwig & Kai Hüschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger, 2018. "Settlements and Appeals in the European Commission’s Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment," Post-Print hal-02163672, HAL.
- Hellwig, Michael & Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich, 2016. "Settlements and appeals in the European Commission's cartel cases: An empirical assessment," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-010, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Fotis, Panagiotis & Tselekounis, Markos, 2020. "Optimal Reduction of Cartel Fines induced by the Settlement Procedure," MPRA Paper 99154, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Peter T. Dijkstra & Jacob Seifert, 2023. "Cartel Leniency and Settlements: A Joint Perspective," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 239-273, September.
- Hans W. Friederiszick, & Linda Gratz, & Michael Rauber,, 2019. "The impact of EU cartel policy reforms on the timing of settlements in private follow-on damages disputes: An empirical assessment of cases from 2001 to 2015," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-19-03, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
- Hellwig, Michael & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2016. "Cartel cases and the cartel enforcement process in the European Union 2001-2015: A quantitative assessment," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-063, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Hans W. Friederiszick & Linda Gratz & Michael Rauber, 2019. "The impact of EU cartel policy reforms on the timing of settlements in private follow-on damages disputes: An empirical assessment of cases from 2001 to 2015," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-19-03_R1, ESMT European School of Management and Technology, revised 25 Jun 2020.
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More about this item
Keywords
Antitrust policy; Cartels; Settlements; Appeals; Ex-post evaluation; European Union;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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