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Cartel cases and the cartel enforcement process in the European Union 2001-2015: A quantitative assessment

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  • Hellwig, Michael
  • Hüschelrath, Kai

Abstract

We provide a comprehensive quantitative assessment of cartels and the related cartel enforcement process in the European Union (EU) from 2001 to 2015. In a first step, we present a detailed characterization of all cartel cases decided by the European Commission (EC) with respect to various criteria such as the number of involved firm groups, cartel market shares and market share asymmetries, involved industries, affected countries, types of infringement, types of cartel breakdown as well as cartel duration. In a second step, we complement this cartel-based analysis with a quantitative assessment of the public cartel enforcement process in the European Union - subdivided further into its duration, types of cartel detection, the leniency program, the settlement procedure, overall fines imposed, and the conclusive appeals process with the General Court (GC) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

Suggested Citation

  • Hellwig, Michael & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2016. "Cartel cases and the cartel enforcement process in the European Union 2001-2015: A quantitative assessment," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-063, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:16063
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Florian Smuda & Patrice Bougette & Kai Hüschelrath, 2015. "Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(6), pages 1352-1369, November.
    2. Hüschelrath, Kai & Peyer, Sebastian, 2013. "Public and private enforcement of competition law: A differentiated approach," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-029, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Russo,Francesco & Schinkel,Maarten Pieter & Günster,Andrea & Carree,Martin, 2011. "European Commission Decisions on Competition," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521295642.
    4. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Economics Working Paper Archive 531, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    5. Hoang, Cung Truong & Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich & Smuda, Florian, 2014. "Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 15-23.
    6. Michael Hellwig & Kai Hüschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger, 2018. "Settlements and Appeals in the European Commission’s Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(1), pages 55-84, February.
    7. Martin Carree & Andrea Günster & Maarten Schinkel, 2010. "European Antitrust Policy 1957–2004: An Analysis of Commission Decisions," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(2), pages 97-131, March.
    8. Harrington, Joseph E., 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 1-105, August.
    9. Cento Veljanovski, 2011. "Deterrence, Recidivism, And European Cartel Fines," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(4), pages 871-915.
    10. Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich, 2015. "The settlement procedure in EC cartel cases: An empirical assesment," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    11. Kai Huschelrath & Sebastian Peyer, 2013. "Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law A Differentiated Approach," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2013-05, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
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    1. Hellwig, Michael & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2018. "When Do Firms Leave Cartels? Determinants And The Impact On Cartel Survival," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 68-84.
    2. Sven Heim & Kai Hhschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger & Yossi Spiegel, 2017. "Minority Share Acquisitions and Collusion: Evidence from the Introduction of National Leniency Programs," Working Papers hal-01952937, HAL.
    3. Christophe Samuel Hutchinson & Gulnara Fliurovna Ruchkina & Sergei Guerasimovich Pavlikov, 2021. "Tacit Collusion on Steroids: The Potential Risks for Competition Resulting from the Use of Algorithm Technology by Companies," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-14, January.
    4. Hans W. Friederiszick, & Linda Gratz, & Michael Rauber,, 2019. "The impact of EU cartel policy reforms on the timing of settlements in private follow-on damages disputes: An empirical assessment of cases from 2001 to 2015," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-19-03, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
    5. Hans W. Friederiszick & Linda Gratz & Michael Rauber, 2019. "The impact of EU cartel policy reforms on the timing of settlements in private follow-on damages disputes: An empirical assessment of cases from 2001 to 2015," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-19-03_R1, ESMT European School of Management and Technology, revised 25 Jun 2020.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competition Policy; Cartels; Collusion; Enforcement; European Union;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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