The settlement procedure in EC cartel cases: An empirical assesment
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Cited by:
- Michael Hellwig & Kai Hüschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger, 2018.
"Settlements and Appeals in the European Commission’s Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(1), pages 55-84, February.
- Hellwig, Michael & Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich, 2016. "Settlements and appeals in the European Commission's cartel cases: An empirical assessment," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-010, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Michael Hellwig & Kai Hüschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger, 2018. "Settlements and Appeals in the European Commission’s Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment," Post-Print hal-02163672, HAL.
- Kai Hüschelrath & Florian Smuda, 2016. "The Appeals Process in the European Commission's Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(2), pages 330-357, June.
- Hellwig, Michael & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2016. "Cartel cases and the cartel enforcement process in the European Union 2001-2015: A quantitative assessment," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-063, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
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More about this item
Keywords
competition policy; cartels; settlements; ex-post evaluation; European Union;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2015-09-11 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EUR-2015-09-11 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-IND-2015-09-11 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2015-09-11 (Law and Economics)
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