Patent litigation settlement in Germany: Why parties settle during trial
AbstractThis paper looks at the decision to settle patent litigation in Germany from a new angle by focusing on detailed data on within-trial actions and motivations by plain-tiff, defendant and the courts. Using a new dataset covering about 80% of all patent litigation cases in Germany between 2000 and 2008 we estimate the likelihood of within-trial settlement. We find that the within-trial settlement decision is to some degree driven by the proceedings that change the pre-trial setting of the negotiations in terms of information and stakes and make previously refused settlement a new option. Additionally, firm-specific stakes as measured by the relation of the involved parties to the disputed patent as well as firm-specific strategies are found to affect the general willingness to settle after the filing of a court case. The results suggest that pre-trial failure of settlement negotiations can to some extent be offset by within-trial settlement through efforts made by court and involved parties, but that the disposition to settle is to a larger degree determined by firm-specific stakes and strategies in the case. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 12-084.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Patent; Patent Litigation; Settlement;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-01-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-IND-2013-01-07 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INO-2013-01-07 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2013-01-07 (Intellectual Property Rights)
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