This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Probabilistic Patents

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Mark A. Lemley
Carl Shapiro

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Economists often assume that a patent gives its owner a well-defined legal right to exclude others from practicing the invention described in the patent. In practice, however, the rights afforded to patent holders are highly uncertain. Under patent law, a patent is no guarantee of exclusion but more precisely a legal right to try to exclude. Since only 0.1% of all patents are litigated to trial, and since nearly half of fully litigated patents are declared invalid, this distinction is critical to understanding the economic impact of patents. The growing recognition among economists and legal scholars that patents are probabilistic property rights has significant implications for our understanding of patents in four important areas: (1) reform of the system by which patents are granted; (2) the legal treatment of patents in litigation; (3) the incentives of patent holders and alleged infringers to settle their disputes through licensing or cross-licensing agreements rather than litigate them to completion; and (4) the antitrust limits on agreements between rivals that settle actual or threatened patent litigation.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/contents/Spring2005.html
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 19 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
Pages: 75-98
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:19:y:2005:i:2:p:75-98

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Andreas Panagopoulos & In-Uck Park, 2008. "Patent Protection, Takeovers, and Startup Innovation: A Dynamic Approach," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/201, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros, 2008. ""Essential" Patents, FRAND Royalties and Technological Standards," ECARES Working Papers 2008_010, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ecares. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Carlos J. POnce, 2007. "More secrecy... more knowledge disclosure? : On disclosure outside of patents," Economics Working Papers we077241, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Bruno Amable & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2006. ""Deep Pockets'', Collateral Assignments of Patents, and the Growth of Innovations," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00112518_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  5. Alfons Palangkaraya & Paul H. Jensen & Elizabeth Webster, 2005. "Determinants of International Patent Examination Outcomes," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2005n06, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  6. Marco, Alan C., 2005. "Learning by Suing: Structural Estimates of Court Errors in Patent Litigation," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 68, Vassar College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. repec:bep:rlecon:3:2007:2:14 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Carl Shapiro, 2006. "Prior User Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 92-96, May. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bernard Caillaud & Anne Duchêne, 2009. "Patent Office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect," PSE Working Papers 2009-39, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  10. Wilfred Dolfsma, 2008. "Innovation Systems as Patent Networks," Working Papers id:1651, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jay Pil Choi, 2006. "How Reasonable is the ‘Reasonable’ Royalty Rate? Damage Rules and Probabilistic Intellectual Property Rights," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  12. Wilfred Dolfsma & Gerben van der Panne, 2007. "Innovations from SMEs or Large Firms? Sector Structure and Dynamics," Working Papers 07-30, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Harhoff, Dietmar & von Graevenitz, Georg & Wagner, Stefan, 2008. "Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets - The Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity," CEPR Discussion Papers 6900, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Lei, Zhen & Wright, Brian D., 2009. "Why weak patents? Rational ignorance or pro-"customer" Tilt?," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49279, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  15. Paul H. Jensen & Elizabeth Webster, 2006. "Managing Knowledge Flows through Appropriation and Learning Strategies," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2006n06, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  16. Philipp N. Baecker, 2006. "An Option-Based View of Imperfect Patent Protection," ebs Working Papers on Finance and Accounting 060601, Department of Finance and Accounting, EUROPEAN BUSINESS SCHOOL (ebs), International University Schloß Reichartshausen, revised 10 Jan 2007. [Downloadable!]
  17. Alan Marco & Kieran Walsh, 2007. "Credibility and Credulity: How Beliefs about Beliefs Affect Entry Incentives," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 11(1), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  18. Sumitro Banerjee & Miklos Sarvary, 2009. "How incumbent firms foster consumer expectations, delay launch but still win the markets for next generation products," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 445-481, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Marco, Alan C., 2006. "The Value of Certainty in Intellectual Property Rights: Stock Market Reactions to Patent Litigation," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 82, Vassar College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  20. Patrick Gaulé, 2006. "Towards Patent Pools in Biotechnology?," CEMI Working Papers cemi-report-2006-010, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Collège du Management de la Technologie, Management of Technology and Entrepreneurship Institute, Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? A few items listed on IDEAS are over 2000 years old!

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.