This paper develops a framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in cross-licensing arrangements in the presence of uncertainty about the validity and coverage of patents that makes disputes inevitable. It analyzes the private incentives to litigate and compares them with the social incentives. It shows that pooling arrangements can have the effect of sheltering invalid patents from challenges. This result has an antitrust implication that patent pools should not be permitted until after patentees have challenged the validity of each other’s patents if litigation costs are not too large.
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Paper provided by Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series PIE/CIS Discussion Paper with number
417.
Length: 42 p. Date of creation: Mar 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hit:piecis:417
Note: Manuscript received December 2007; revised September 2008., Shortened Title: Patent Pools and Litigation, Patent Pools and Litigation Contact details of provider: Web page: http://cis.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Koji OHTAGAKI).
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