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Post-Issue Patent "Quality Control": A Comparative Study of US Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions

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Author Info
Stuart J. H. Graham (University of California, Berkeley)
Bronwyn H. Hall (University of California, Berkeley & NBER)
Dietmar Harhoff (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München & CEPR)
David C. Mowery (University of California, Berkeley & NBER)

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Abstract

We report the results of the first comparative study of the determinants and effects of patent oppositions in Europe and of re- examinations on corresponding patents issued in the United States. The analysis is based on a dataset consisting of matched EPO and US patents. Our analysis focuses on two broad technology categories - biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors and computer software. Within these fields, we collect data on all EPO patents for which oppositions were filed at the EPO. We also construct a random sample of EPO patents with no opposition in these technologies. We match these EPO patents with the “equivalent” US patents covering the same invention in the United States. Using the matched sample of USPTO and EPO patents, we compare the determinants of opposition and of reexamination. Our results indicate that valuable patents are more likely to be challenged in both jurisdictions. But the rate of opposition at the EPO is more than thirty times higher than the rate of reexamination at the USPTO.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 0303009.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 19 Mar 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0303009

Note: 46 pages, Acrobat .pdf
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  9. Harhoff, Dietmar & Reitzig, Markus, 2002. "Determinants of Opposition Against EPO Patent Grants - The Case of Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals," CEPR Discussion Papers 3645, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Kortum, Samuel & Lerner, Josh, 1999. "What is behind the recent surge in patenting?1," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Graham, Stuart J.H. & Harhoff, Dietmar, 2006. "Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents," CEPR Discussion Papers 5680, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Stuart Graham & David Mowrey, 2004. "Submarines in software? continuations in US software patenting in the 1980s and 1990s," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 13(5), pages 443-456, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. repec:bep:capsoc:1:2007:3:3 is not listed on IDEAS
    Other versions:
  4. Alfons Palangkaraya & Paul H. Jensen & Elizabeth Webster, 2005. "Determinants of International Patent Examination Outcomes," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2005n06, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lanjouw, Jean O & Schankerman, Mark, 2001. "Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 3093, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. David Encaoua & Yassine Lefouili, 2009. "Licensing weak patents," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00415747_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  7. Yann Ménière, 2008. "Non-Obviousness and Complementary Innovations," Post-Print hal-00397192_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jean Olson Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 2001. "Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 30, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  9. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2008. "Développement et impact des stratégies de dépôt de brevets," Working Papers CEB 08-041.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Blind, Knut & Cremers, Katrin & Mueller, Elisabeth, 2007. "The Influence of Strategic Patenting on Companies? Patent Portfolios," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-013, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2007. "The puzzle of patent value indicators," Working Papers CEB 07-023.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  12. repec:bep:eaptop:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1329-1329 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2007. "Patents only live twice: a patent survival analysis in Europe," Working Papers CEB 07-028.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  14. Jean Olson Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 2001. "Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 8656, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Michele Cincera, 2008. "Déterminants des oppositions de brevets:une analyse micro-économique au niveau belge," Working Papers DULBEA 08-02.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
  16. Bronwyn H. Hall, 2009. "Business and Financial Method Patents, Innovation, and Policy," NBER Working Papers 14868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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