Patent Pools And Cross-Licensing In The Shadow Of Patent Litigation
AbstractThis article develops a framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in cross-licensing arrangements in the presence of uncertainty about the validity and coverage of patents that makes disputes inevitable. It analyzes the private incentives to litigate and compares them with the social incentives. It shows that pooling arrangements can have the effect of sheltering invalid patents from challenges. This result has an antitrust implication that patent pools should not be permitted until after patentees have challenged the validity of each other's patents if litigation costs are not too large. Copyright (2010) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 51 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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Other versions of this item:
- Jay Pil Choi, 2009. "Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd08-044, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Choi, Jay Pil, 2009. "Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper 417, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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