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Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

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  • Jay Pil Choi

Abstract

This paper develops a framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in cross-licensing arrangements in the presence of uncertainty about the validity and coverage of patents that makes disputes inevitable. It analyzes the private incentives to litigate and compares them with the social incentives. It shows that pooling arrangements can have the effect of sheltering invalid patents from challenges. This result has an antitrust implication that patent pools should not be permitted until after patentees have challenged the validity of each otherfs patents if litigation costs are not too large.

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File URL: http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/research/discussion/2008/pdf/gd08-044.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series with number gd08-044.

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Date of creation: Mar 2009
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Handle: RePEc:hst:ghsdps:gd08-044

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Cited by:
  1. Jeitschko Thomas D. & Zhang Nanyun, 2014. "Adverse Effects of Patent Pooling on Product Development and Commercialization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 31, January.
  2. Doh-Shin Jeon & Yassine Lefouili, 2013. "Cross-Licensing and Competition," Working Papers 13-11, NET Institute.
  3. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00847955 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Steffen Brenner, 2009. "Optimal formation rules for patent pools," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 373-388, September.
  5. Arijit Mukherjee, 2013. "Patent pool under endogenous technology choice," Discussion Paper Series 2013_07, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Jul 2013.
  6. Thomas Jeitschko & Nanyun Zhang, 2011. "Patent Pools and Product Development," Working Papers 2011-02, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2011.
  7. Gilbert, Richard J. & Katz, Michael L., 2011. "Efficient division of profits from complementary innovations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 443-454, July.
  8. Lemley, Mark A. & Shapiro, Carl, 2004. "Probabilistic Patents," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt9xf1488p, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  9. Rabah Amir & David Encaoua & Yassine Lefouili, 2013. "Optimal Licensing of Uncertain Patents in the Shadow of Litigation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00847955, HAL.
  10. Akifumi Ishihara & Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2013. "Dark Sides of Patent Pools with Compulsory Independent Licensing," CARF F-Series CARF-F-318, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  11. Ghafele, Roya & Gibert, Benjamin, 2011. "The Transaction Cost Benefits of Electronic Patent Licensing Platforms: A Discussion at the Example of the PatentBooks Model," MPRA Paper 36010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Jan 2012.
  12. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00595493 is not listed on IDEAS

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