The Settlement of Patent Litigation
AbstractIn this article I develop a model to analyze patent licensing that is induced as part of a settlement agreement to avoid litigation of the issue of patent validity. The patentee possesses private information about patent validity and makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to a single potential rival. An essentially unique sequential equilibrium exists if out-of-equilibrium beliefs are restricted appropriately. The model analyzes the effect of the probability of settlement and litigation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 20 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Marco, Alan C., 2005.
"The option value of patent litigation: Theory and evidence,"
Review of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 323-351.
- Marco, Alan, 2001. "The Option Value of Patent Litigation: Theory and Evidence," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 52, Vassar College Department of Economics, revised Dec 2003.
- Christopher C. Klein, 2007. "Anticompetitive Litigation and Antitrust Liability," Working Papers 200713, Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Alan Marco & Gordon Rausser, 2011.
"Complementarities and spillovers in mergers: an empirical investigation using patent data,"
Economics of Innovation and New Technology,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(3), pages 207-231.
- Marco, Alan C. & Rausser, Gordon C, 2002. "Complementarities and spill-overs in mergers: an empirical investigation using patent data," CUDARE Working Paper Series 930R, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
- Marco, Alan C. & Rausser, Gordon C., 2002. "Complementarities and spill-overs in mergers: an empirical investigation using patent data," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt93s769k8, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Mitchell, Matthew & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2012.
"Shared Rights and Technological Progress,"
36537, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Adriana Breccia & Héctor Salgado Banda, 2005. "Competing or Colluding in a Stochastic Environment," Working Papers 2005-04, Banco de México.
- Marco, Alan C., 2006. "The Value of Certainty in Intellectual Property Rights: Stock Market Reactions to Patent Litigation," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 82, Vassar College Department of Economics.
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 2007.
"How Strong Are Weak Patents?,"
Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series
qt8vg425vj, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2013. "Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem : An analysis of Article L. 615-7," EconomiX Working Papers 2013-37, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
- Jean Olson Lanjouw, 1992. "Under Threat: Potential Competition, Litigation and the Private Value of Patent Protection," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 06, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, 2005.
"Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes,"
0502, Research on Innovation.
- Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 1997. "The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature," NBER Working Papers 6296, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Reiko Aoki & Jin-Li Hu, 1996. "Licensing vs. Litigation: Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate," Industrial Organization 9612002, EconWPA.
- Adriana Breccia & Hector Salgado-Banda, 2006. "Competing or Colluding in a Stochastic Environment," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 423, Society for Computational Economics.
- Jean O Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 2004. "The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Literature," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000486, David K. Levine.
- Roland Kirstein & Birgit Will, 2006.
"Efficient compensation for employees' inventions,"
European Journal of Law and Economics,
Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 129-148, April.
- Kirstein, Roland & Will, Birgit E., 2003. "Efficient Compensation for Employees? Inventions," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2003-03, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Roland Kirstein & Birgit Will, . "Efficient Compensation for Employees’ Inventions," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2004-1-1080, Berkeley Electronic Press.
- Adriana Breccia & Hector Salgado-Banda, 2005. "Competing or Colluding in a Stochastic Framework," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0504, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.