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Determinants of Patent Litigation in Germany

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Author Info
Cremers, Katrin
Abstract

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of patent litigation in Germany, based on information from suits filed during the period from 1993 to 1995 at two of the three most important district courts. A control group was formed by selecting a random sample from the population data taken at this period of time. The results of a probit analysis show that relatively valuable patents are more likely to be involved in litigation cases than the average patent. Patents which have survived opposition are more likely to encounter subsequent litigation actions after the granting procedure than patents which have not been opposed. Patent owner?s ability to trade patents with potential infringers and to interact with them repeatedly appears to promote pretrial settlement and to prevent patentees from filing suits. In contrast to results for the U.S., individual patent owners in Germany were found to be no more likely to face litigation than companies. --

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Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 04-72.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:2363

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Related research
Keywords: Patent; Infringement; Litigation; Innovation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Lanjouw, Jean O & Schankerman, Mark, 2001. "Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 129-51, Spring.
  2. Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe and Manuel Trajtenberg., 2000. "Market Value and Patent Citations: A First Look," Economics Working Papers E00-277, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Kathryn E. Spier, 1994. "Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 197-214, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Katz, Avery, 1987. "Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 143-76, Fall.
  5. Lanjouw, Jean O & Lerner, Josh, 2001. "Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 573-603, October.
  6. Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 1997. "The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature," NBER Working Papers 6296, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Michael J. Meurer, 1989. "The Settlement of Patent Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 77-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Waldfogel, Joel, 1998. "Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 451-76, October.
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  9. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hall, B. & Jaffe, A. & Trajtenberg, M., 2001. "The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools," Papers 2001-29, Tel Aviv.
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  11. Babcock, Linda & Loewenstein, George, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-26, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2002. "Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases," Staff General Research Papers 5231, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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  13. Scherer, Frederic M. & Harhoff, Dietmar & Vopel, Katrin, 1997. "Exploring the Tail of Patented Invention Value Distributions," ZEW Discussion Papers 97-30, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Ordover, Janusz A & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(4), pages 879-88, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-97, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. van Pottelsberghe, Bruno & van Zeebroeck, Nicolas, 2008. "Filing Strategies and Patent Value," CEPR Discussion Papers 6821, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Sofka, Wolfgang & Schmidt, Tobias, 2004. "I Like The Way You Move : An Empirical Investigation into the Mechanisms Behind First Mover and Follower Strategies," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-87, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2007. "The puzzle of patent value indicators," Working Papers CEB 07-023.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  4. Katrin Cremers, 2009. "Settlement during patent litigation trials. An empirical analysis for Germany," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 182-195, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2007. "Patents only live twice: a patent survival analysis in Europe," Working Papers CEB 07-028.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
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