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Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases

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Author Info
Crampes, Claude
Langinier, Corinne

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Abstract

A patent is not a perfect protection against imitation. It only grants the patentholder the right to sue intruders once they have been identified. In order to identify an infringer, a patentholder must first monitor the market, and then react in case of infringement. His reaction may be to go to court, to settle an agreement or to accept the entry. We investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how the reaction of the patentholder may influence the entry decision. In a simultaneous game we show that even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of condemnation is high, the patentholder may prefer a settlement over a trial. Furthermore, there exist cases in which the likelihood of entry increases with the penalty. In sequential games, we show that regardless of whether the patentholder or the potential infringer plays first, entry occurs comparatively less often than in the simultaneous game.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 5231.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 2002
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Publication status: Published in RAND Journal of Economics, Summer 2002, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 258-274.
Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:5231

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L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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  3. Mario Calderini & Giuseppe Scellato, 2004. "Intellectual property rights as strategic assets: the case of european patent opposition in the telecommunication industry," CESPRI Working Papers 158, CESPRI, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Jul 2004. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jay Pil Choi, 2006. "How Reasonable is the ‘Reasonable’ Royalty Rate? Damage Rules and Probabilistic Intellectual Property Rights," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  5. Llobet, Gerard & Suarez, Javier, 2005. "Financing and the Protection of Innovators," CEPR Discussion Papers 4944, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. repec:att:wimass:1920030 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2005. "Contributory Infringement Rule and Patents," Staff General Research Papers 12268, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Carlos J. POnce, 2007. "More secrecy... more knowledge disclosure? : On disclosure outside of patents," Economics Working Papers we077241, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Langinier, Corinne, 2004. "Using patents to mislead rivals," Staff General Research Papers 11483, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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  10. Adriana Breccia & Hector Salgado-Banda, 2005. "Competing or Colluding in a Stochastic Framework," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0504, Birkbeck, School of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Philipp N. Baecker, 2006. "An Option-Based View of Imperfect Patent Protection," ebs Working Papers on Finance and Accounting 060601, Department of Finance and Accounting, EUROPEAN BUSINESS SCHOOL (ebs), International University Schloß Reichartshausen, revised 10 Jan 2007. [Downloadable!]
  12. Adriana Breccia & Hector Salgado-Banda, 2006. "Competing or Colluding in a Stochastic Environment," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 423, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Georg von Graevenitz, 2007. "Which Reputations Does a Brand Owner Need? Evidence from Trade Mark Opposition," Discussion Papers 215, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  14. Cremers, Katrin, 2004. "Determinants of Patent Litigation in Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-72, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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