This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Claude Crampes
Corinne Langinier

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A patent grants its owner the right to sue intruders that have been identified. The patentholder must then supervise the market and react in case of infringement. His reaction may be to go to court, to settle, or to accept entry. We investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how it will influence the entry decision. In a simultaneous game, even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of a finding of liability is high, the patentholder may prefer a settlement to a trial. The likelihood of entry may increase with the penalty. In sequential games, regardless who plays first, entry occurs comparatively less often than in the simultaneous game.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 33 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 258-274
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:33:y:2002:i:summer:p:258-274

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Roland Kirstein & Birgit Will, 2006. "Efficient compensation for employees' inventions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 129-148, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Mario Calderini & Giuseppe Scellato, 2004. "Intellectual property rights as strategic assets: the case of european patent opposition in the telecommunication industry," CESPRI Working Papers 158, CESPRI, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Jul 2004. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jay Pil Choi, 2006. "How Reasonable is the ‘Reasonable’ Royalty Rate? Damage Rules and Probabilistic Intellectual Property Rights," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Llobet, Gerard & Suarez, Javier, 2005. "Financing and the Protection of Innovators," CEPR Discussion Papers 4944, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. repec:att:wimass:1920030 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Carlos J. POnce, 2007. "More secrecy... more knowledge disclosure? : On disclosure outside of patents," Economics Working Papers we077241, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Langinier, Corinne, 2004. "Using patents to mislead rivals," Staff General Research Papers 11483, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  8. Adriana Breccia & Hector Salgado-Banda, 2005. "Competing or Colluding in a Stochastic Framework," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0504, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
  9. repec:bep:rlecon:3:2007:2:14 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. David Encaoua & Yassine Lefouili, 2009. "Licensing weak patents," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00415747_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  11. Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2005. "Contributory Infringement Rule and Patents," Staff General Research Papers 12268, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Philipp N. Baecker, 2006. "An Option-Based View of Imperfect Patent Protection," ebs Working Papers on Finance and Accounting 060601, Department of Finance and Accounting, EUROPEAN BUSINESS SCHOOL (ebs), International University Schloß Reichartshausen, revised 10 Jan 2007. [Downloadable!]
  13. Adriana Breccia & Hector Salgado-Banda, 2006. "Competing or Colluding in a Stochastic Environment," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 423, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, 2005. "Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes," Working Papers 0502, Research on Innovation. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Georg von Graevenitz, 2007. "Which Reputations Does a Brand Owner Need? Evidence from Trade Mark Opposition," Discussion Papers 215, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  16. Cremers, Katrin, 2004. "Determinants of Patent Litigation in Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-72, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.