Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Patent thickets, courts, and the market for innovation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Alberto Galasso
  • Mark Schankerman

Abstract

We study how fragmentation of patent rights and the formation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affected the duration of patent disputes, and thus the speed of technology diffusion through licensing. We develop a model of patent litigation which predicts faster settlement when patent rights are fragmented and when there is less uncertainty about court outcomes, as was associated with the pro-patent shift of the CAFC. We confirm these predictions empirically using a data set that covers patent suits in U.S. district courts during the period 1975-2000. Finally, we analyze how fragmentation affects total settlement delay, considering both the reduction in dispute duration and the increase in the number of patent negotiations. Copyright (c) 2010, RAND.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00108.x
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by RAND Corporation in its journal The RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 41 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 472-503

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:41:y:2010:i:3:p:472-503

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138
Phone: 310-393-0411
Fax: 310-393-4818
Email:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0741-6261
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0741-6261

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. David S. Abrams & Ufuk Akcigit & Jillian Popadak, 2013. "Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption?," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-065, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  2. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman & Carlos J. Serrano, 2011. "Trading and Enforcing Patent Rights," CEP Discussion Papers dp1072, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  3. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, 2013. "Patents and cumulative innovation: causal evidence from the courts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 51539, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  4. Bottazzi, Laura, 2009. "The role of venture capital in alleviating financial constraints of innovative firms," EIB Papers 9/2009, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
  5. Darcy, Jacques & Krämer-Eis, Helmut & Guellec, Dominique & Debande, Olivier, 2009. "Financing technology transfer," EIB Papers 10/2009, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
  6. Galasso, Alberto & Schankerman, Mark, 2013. "Patents and Cumulative Innovation:Causal Evidence from the Courts," IIR Working Paper 13-16, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  7. Ralph Siebert, 2013. "Are Ex Ante and Ex Post Licensing Agreements Useful Instruments to Lessen Uncertainty in R&D?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4535, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Dietmar Harhoff & Georg von Graevenitz & Stefan Wagner, 2012. "Conflict resolution, public goods and patent thickets," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-12-04 (R1), ESMT European School of Management and Technology, revised 25 Mar 2013.
  9. Harhoff, Dietmar, 2009. "The role of patents and licenses in securing external finance for innovation," EIB Papers 11/2009, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
  10. Mueller, Elisabeth & Cockburn, Iain M. & MacGarvie, Megan, 2013. "Access to intellectual property for innovation: Evidence on problems and coping strategies from German firms," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 529-541.
  11. Gallini, Nancy, 2010. "Private Agreements for Coordinating Patent Rights: The Case of Patent Pools," Economics working papers nancy_gallini-2010-34, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 17 Nov 2010.
  12. Subramanian, Annapoornima M. & Lim, Kwanghui & Soh, Pek-Hooi, 2013. "When birds of a feather don’t flock together: Different scientists and the roles they play in biotech R&D alliances," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 595-612.
  13. Hall, Bronwyn H., 2009. "The financing of innovative firms," EIB Papers 8/2009, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
  14. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, 2013. "Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts," CEP Discussion Papers dp1205, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  15. Bas Straathof & Sander van Veldhuizen, 2012. "Market size, institutions, and the value of rights provided by patents," CPB Discussion Paper 226, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  16. Schwiebacher, Franz, 2013. "Does fragmented or heterogeneous IP ownership stifle investments in innovation?," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-096, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  17. Galasso, Alberto, 2010. "Over-confidence may reduce negotiation delay," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 716-733, December.
  18. NAGAOKA Sadao & NISHIMURA Yoichiro, 2014. "Complementarity, Fragmentation, and the Effects of Patent Thickets," Discussion papers 14001, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  19. Fischer, Timo & Henkel, Joachim, 2012. "Patent trolls on markets for technology – An empirical analysis of NPEs’ patent acquisitions," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(9), pages 1519-1533.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:41:y:2010:i:3:p:472-503. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.