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Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Waldfogel, Joel
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics .
Volume (Year): 41 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 451-76
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:41:y:1998:i:2:p:451-76Contact details of provider: Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637 Fax: (773) 753-0811 Email: Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Barry Nalebuff, 1987.
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Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984.
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Grossman, Gene M & Katz, Michael L, 1983.
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American Economic Review ,
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Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1994.
"An Economic Model of Legal Discovery ,"
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Eisenberg, Theodore, 1990.
"Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests ,"
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Siegelman, Peter & Donohue, John J, III, 1995.
"The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis ,"
Journal of Legal Studies ,
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Waldfogel, Joel, 1995.
"The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff Victory ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
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Other versions:
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2004.
"Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach ,"
Working Papers
2004-24, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
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Other versions:
Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper Vries, de, 2000.
"Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
[Downloadable!] Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2000.
"Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach ,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 00-13, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
[Downloadable!] Baye, M.R. & Kovenock D. & De Vries, C.G., 2000.
"Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: an Auction-Theoretic Approach ,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1137, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2000.
"Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach ,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
00-103/2, Tinbergen Institute.
[Downloadable!] Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 2005.
"Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 583-601, 07.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2008.
"Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties ,"
MPRA Paper
8995, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 1997.
"Stylized Facts of Patent Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership ,"
NBER Working Papers
6297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Jean O Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 2004.
"The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Literature ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
122247000000000486, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, 2002.
""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation ,"
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series
1072, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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Other versions:
Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, .
"Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation ,"
German Working Papers in Law and Economics
2002-1-1038, Berkeley Electronic Press.
[Downloadable!] Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, 2004.
""Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation ,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) ,
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 555-, December.
Langlais, Eric, 2008.
"Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse ,"
MPRA Paper
8844, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Georg von Graevenitz, 2007.
"Which Reputations Does a Brand Owner Need? Evidence from Trade Mark Opposition ,"
Discussion Papers
215, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Cremers, Katrin, 2004.
"Determinants of Patent Litigation in Germany ,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
04-72, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Jean Olson Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 1998.
"Stylised Fact of Patent Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership ,"
STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers
20, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
[Downloadable!]
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