Litigation and settlement : new evidence from labor courts in Mexico
AbstractUsing a newly assembled data set on procedures filed in Mexican labor tribunals, the authors of this paper study the determinants of final awards to workers. On average, workers recover less than 30 percent of their claim. The strongest result is that workers receive higher percentages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments. It is also found that cases with multiple claimants against a single firm are less likely to be settled, which partially explains why workers involved in these procedures receive lower percentages of their claims. Finally, the authors find evidence that a worker who exaggerates his or her claim is less likely to settle.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 4434.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress; Arbitration; Information Security&Privacy; Labor Markets; Judicial System Reform;
Other versions of this item:
- Davis S. Kaplan & Joyce Sadka & Jorge Luis Silva-Mendez, 2006. "Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico," Working Papers 0606, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- NEP-ALL-2007-12-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2007-12-19 (Development)
- NEP-LAB-2007-12-19 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2007-12-19 (Law & Economics)
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