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Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?

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Author Info
Katz, Avery
Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 3 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (Fall)
Pages: 143-76
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:3:y:1987:i:2:p:143-76

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  1. Coughlan, Peter J. & Plott, Charles R., 1997. "An Experimental Analysis of the Structure of Legal Fees: American Rule vs. English Rule," Working Papers 1025, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-32, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse," MPRA Paper 8844, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Louis Kaplow, 1994. "Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards," NBER Working Papers 4263, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Eric Langlais, 2008. "Asymmetric information, self-serving bias and the pretrial negotiation impasse," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-30, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
  6. Cremers, Katrin, 2004. "Determinants of Patent Litigation in Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-72, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-15.

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