Cartel enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the duration of investigations
AbstractWe provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commission's speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 12-071.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Competition Policy; Empirical Analysis; Cartels; European Union; Fines; Leniency; Duration of Investigation;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-12-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EUR-2012-12-06 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-HME-2012-12-06 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-IND-2012-12-06 (Industrial Organization)
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