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The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives

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  • Steven Shavell
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    Abstract

    The appeals process—whereby litigants can have decisions of adjudicators reviewed by a higher authority—is a general feature of formal legal systems (and of many private decision-making procedures). The appeals process leads to the making of better decisions because it constitutes a threat to adjudicators whose decisions would deviate too much from socially desirable ones. Further, it yields this benefit without absorbing resources to the extent that adjudicators can anticipate when appeals would occur and would want to make decisions to forestall the actual occurrence of appeals.

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    File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/500095
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal The Journal of Legal Studies.

    Volume (Year): 35 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 1 (01)
    Pages: 1-29

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    Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:35:y:2006:p:1-29

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    Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/

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    Cited by:
    1. Will, Birgit E. & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2008. "Fighting cartels: some economics of council regulation (EC) 1/2003," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2008-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    2. Maria Antonelli & Veronica Grembi, 2013. "A microeconomic model of the demand of civil justice: is one institutional context better than another?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 295-318, October.
    3. Deffains, Bruno & Gabuthy, Yannick & Lambert, Eve-Angéline, 2010. "Labour disputes, investment decisions and the judiciary," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 424-433, April.
    4. Chifeng Dai, 2010. "Imperfect verification, appeals, and limited liability," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 23-41, February.
    5. Dai, Chifeng, 2009. "The appeals process in principal-agent relationships," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 451-462, August.
    6. Aspasia Tsaoussi & Eleni Zervogianni, 2010. "Judges as satisficers: a law and economics perspective on judicial liability," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 333-357, June.
    7. Bharat Bhole & Bríd Gleeson Hanna, 2009. "An analytical framework for interpreting appellate court data," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 1163-1174.
    8. Flavio Menezes & Magnus Söderberg & Miguel Santolino, 2012. "Regulatory behaviour under threat of court reversal," Discussion Papers Series 472, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.

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