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Bayesian Monitoring

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  • Kirstein, Roland

Abstract

This paper presents a modification of the inspection game: The ?Bayesian Monitoring? model rests on the assumption that judges are interested in enforcing compliant behavior and making correct decisions. They may base their judgements on an informative but imperfect signal which can be generated costlessly. In the original inspection game, monitoring is costly and generates a perfectly informative signal. While the inspection game has only one mixed strategy equilibrium, three Perfect Bayesian Equilibria exist in my model (one in pure strategies, two in mixed). These outcomes can be described with respect to their punishment styles: tyrannic, draconian, and lenient. The Bayesian Monitoring model, just as the inspection game, has different implications than enforcement models in the tradition of Becker (1968). Total deterrence of bad behavior is impossible, and the equilibrium probability of good behavior is independent of the suspect?s own payoff parameters. Hence, the maximum fine result does not apply.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirstein, Roland, 2005. "Bayesian Monitoring," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2005-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200506
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Imperfect Decision-Making; Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; Enforcement; Maximum Fine Result;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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