Credible Criminal Enforcement

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Credible Criminal Enforcement

Author Info

Matthew J. Baker (United States Naval Academy)
Thomas J. Miceli (University of Connecticut)

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Abstract

Economic models of crime and punishment implicitly assume that the government can credibly commit to the fines, sentences, and apprehension rates it has chosen. We study the government's problem when credibility is an issue. We find that several of the standard predictions of the economic model of crime and punishment are robust to commitment, but that credibility may in some cases result in lower apprehension rates, and hence a higher crime rate, compared to the static version of the model.

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Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2003-40.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2003-40

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Article
- Matthew Baker & Thomas Miceli, 2005. "Credible Criminal Enforcement," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 5-15, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-10-28 (All new papers)
NEP-LAW-2003-10-28 (Law & Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Boadway, Robin & Marceau, Nicolas & Marchand, Maurice, 1996. "Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 51(2), pages 149-65.
Other versions:
- BOADWAYÊ, Robin & MARCEAUÊ, Nicolas & MARCHANDÊ, Maurice, 1994. "Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions," CORE Discussion Papers 1994010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Robin W. Boadway & Nicolas Marceau & Maurice Marchand, 1993. "Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions," Working Papers 883, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Boadway, R. & Marceau, N. & Marchand, M., 1993. "Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions," Papers 9318, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
Winand Emons, 2004. "Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 496-502, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Winand Emons, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0211, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
- Emons, Winand, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," CEPR Discussion Papers 3667, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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