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Crime and Punishment: Are One-Shot, Two-Person Games Enough?

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  • Bianco, William T.
  • Ordeshook, Peter C.
  • Tsebelis, George

Abstract

George Tsebelis argued in the March 1989 issue of this Review that decision theory is completely appropriate for analyzing games against nature but not appropriate for dissecting games against a rational opponent. Analysts who mistake a rational opponent for nature in constructing models commit what Tsebelis calls “the Robinson Crusoe fallacy.†In this controversy, William Bianco and Peter Ordeshook attack components of Tsebelis's argument. Bianco believes the model should be set up as an iterated, rather than a one-shot, game. Ordeshook feels that proper modeling cannot rely merely on two-person games and, in addition, he argues that Tsebelis commits some technical errors. In his reply, Tsebelis joins the issues and buttresses his original analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Bianco, William T. & Ordeshook, Peter C. & Tsebelis, George, 1990. "Crime and Punishment: Are One-Shot, Two-Person Games Enough?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(2), pages 569-586, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:84:y:1990:i:02:p:569-586_19
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    Cited by:

    1. Jack Hirshleifer & Eric Rasmusen, 1992. "Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 353-367, July.
    2. Pradiptyo Rimawan, 2007. "Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 197-219, August.
    3. Gianfranco Gambarelli & Daniele Gervasio & Francesca Maggioni & Daniel Faccini, 2022. "A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 295-307, June.
    4. Franz Weissing & Elinor Ostrom, 1991. "Crime and Punishment: Further Reflections on the Counterintuitive Results of Mixed Equilibria Games," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(3), pages 343-350, July.
    5. Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October.
    6. Rimawan Pradiptyo, 2015. "A Certain Uncertainty; Assessment of Court Decisions in Tackling Corruption in Indonesia," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: R N Ghosh & M A B Siddique (ed.), CORRUPTION, GOOD GOVERNANCE and ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Contemporary Analysis and Case Studies, chapter 10, pages 167-215, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Arun Agrawal, 1997. "Shepherds and Their Leaders Among the Raikas of India," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 9(2), pages 235-263, April.
    8. Baker, Matthew J. & Miceli, Thomas J., 2021. "Crime, credible enforcement, and multiple equilibria," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    9. Kirstein, Roland, 2005. "Bayesian Monitoring," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2005-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    10. George Tsebelis, 1991. "The Effect of Fines on Regulated Industries," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(1), pages 81-101, January.
    11. George Tsebelis, 1993. "Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(3), pages 349-374, July.
    12. Bruni, Camilla & Nuño, Juan Carlos & Primicerio, Mario, 2013. "What if criminals optimize their choice? Optimal strategies to defend public goods," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 392(4), pages 840-850.
    13. John Brehm & Scott Gates, 1994. "When Supervision Fails to Induce Compliance," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 323-343, July.
    14. Shidiqi, khalifany ash & Pradiptyo, rimawan, 2011. "A game theoretical analysis of economic sanction," MPRA Paper 30481, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Heiko Rauhut & Marcel Junker, 2009. "Punishment Deters Crime Because Humans Are Bounded in Their Strategic Decision-Making," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 12(3), pages 1-1.
    16. Roland Kirstein, 2014. "Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Enforcement," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 15(4), pages 385-409, August.

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