A game theoretical analysis of economic sanction
AbstractEconomic sanction has been widely used and increasingly a popular tool in maintaining peace and political stability in the world. The use of economic sanction, as opposed to the use of military power, to punish target countries have been supported by the Charter of United Nations (UN). Tsebelis (1990) modelled economic sanctions using game theory and found that any attempt to increase the severity of the sanctions was counterintuitive, namely the policy reduced the likelihood of sender country(s) in enforcing economic sanction, however, it did not change the probability of the target country(s) in violating international agreement/law. This paper focuses on the refinement of the sanction game proposed by Tsebelis (1990) to analyse international relations. Recent findings from various studies on the effectiveness of economic sanction have been used to reconstruct the game. In contrast to Tsebelis’(1990) findings, any attempt to increase the severity of economic sanction may reduce the probability of the target country(s) in violating international agreement/law. A similar result was obtained in the case for which the sender country(s) applies any policy in preventing violation of international agreement/law by providing aids, assistances, and incentives to the target country.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 30481.
Date of creation: 25 Feb 2011
Date of revision:
Economic Sanction; the Sanction/Inspection Games; Mixed Strategy Equilibrium;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-02-20 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-02-20 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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