Wallenstein’s Power Problem and Its Consequences
AbstractThis paper wants to be both: an introduction to game-theoretical thinking as well as a game-theoretical discussion of Schiller’s Wallenstein. Note that the intention of this article is to convince theatergoers and people who work in the theatrical arts that it is worthwhile to study some game theory. Others will hopefully profit from the unusual Wallenstein interpretation. It is not this article’s purpose to teach game theorists, but rather to inspire applications. The drama is depicted as a game and consequently submitted to a formal analysis that is based on the economic concept of rationality. Weber’s definition of power is operationalized and applied to Wallenstein’s decision situation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 2 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
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- Luciano Andreozzi, 2002. "Oscilliations in the Enforcement of Law: an Evolutionary Analysis," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 18, pages 403-428.
- Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October.
- Wittman, Donald, 1985. "Counter-intuitive results in game theory," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 77-89.
- Holler, Manfred J, 1993. " Fighting Pollution When Decisions Are Strategic," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 347-56, August.
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