Fighting Pollution When Decisions Are Strategic
AbstractIn this paper, the author analyzes antipollution policies in a 2-by-2 game played between a 'polluter' and the 'police' in which the payoffs can be manipulated by an exogenous third player called the 'policymaker.' He shows that the efficiency of the policies may depend on whether the players of the 2-by-2 game choose Nash equilibrium strategies or prefer maximin. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 76 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Péter Cserne, . "The Normativity of Law in Law and Economics," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2004-1-1113, Berkeley Electronic Press.
- Arce, Daniel G., 2010. "Corporate virtue: Treatment of whistle blowers and the punishment of violators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 363-371, September.
- Buechel, Berno & Emrich, Eike & Pohlkamp, Stefanie, 2013. "Nobody's innocent: the role of customers in the doping dilemma," MPRA Paper 44627, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Tempting righteous citizens? Counterintuitive effects of increasing sanctions in the realm of organized crime," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 37-40.
- Manfred J. Holler & Barbara Klose-Ullmann, 2008. "Wallenstein’s Power Problem and Its Consequences," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(3), pages 197-218, December.
- Alfred Endres & Andreas LÃ¼deke, 1998. "Limited Liability and Imperfect Informationâ€”On the Existence of Safety Equilibria Under Products Liability Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 153-165, March.
- Josef Montag, 2013.
"A Radical Change in Traffic Law: Effects on Fatalities in the Czech Republic,"
CERGE-EI Working Papers
wp484, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
- Josef Montag, 2013. "A radical change in traffic law: effects on fatalities in the Czech Republic," MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics 2013-39, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics.
- Tim Friehe, 2008. "Correlated payoffs in the inspection game: some theory and an application to corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 127-143, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.