Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game
AbstractWe attempt to revise the inspection game used by George Tsebelis to model phenomena in criminal justice. The refinement has been conducted by disaggregating the game payoffs and then using findings from empirical studies to reconstruct the game. In contrast to Tsebelis propositions, we find that the severity of punishment may affect the offending behavior of individuals. The result also holds for the case in which the authority initiates crime prevention programs, by providing incentives to those who do not have a criminal history. The impact of increasing the severity of punishment on reducing individuals offending behavior is less certain than that of instigating crime prevention programs. This result holds so long as the authority does not alter the levels of enforcement.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Law & Economics.
Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
Other versions of this item:
- Rimawan Pradiptyo, . "Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1142, Berkeley Electronic Press.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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NBER Working Papers
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- Dominic Spengler, 2012. "Endogenising Detection in an Asymmetric Penalties Corruption Game," Discussion Papers 12/20, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Shidiqi, khalifany ash & Pradiptyo, rimawan, 2011. "A game theoretical analysis of economic sanction," MPRA Paper 30481, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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