Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game
AbstractWe attempt to revise the inspection game used by Tsebelis (1989, 1990, 1993 and Tsebelis in Bianco et al, 1990) to model phenomena in criminal justice. Recent findings from various studies, primarily conducted in the UK, are used to re-construct the game. In contrast to Tsebelis' (1989) propositions, we found that the severity of punishment may affect individuals' offending behaviour. Similar results can be found for the case in which the authority initiates crime prevention initiatives by providing incentives to law abiding individuals. Any attempts to increase the severity of punishment are less certain in reducing individuals' offending behaviour than crime prevention initiatives. This result holds so long as the authority does not alter the levels of enforcement and the severity of punishment.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its series German Working Papers in Law and Economics with number 2006-1-1142.
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/
Punishment; Deterrence effect; Crime prevention; Game theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Pradiptyo Rimawan, 2007. "Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 197-219, August.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2007-03-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAW-2007-03-24 (Law & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ehrlich, Isaac, 1977. "The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 452-58, June.
- Ehrlich, Isaac, 1975.
"The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 397-417, June.
- Isaac Ehrlich, 1973. "The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death," NBER Working Papers 0018, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October.
- Dominic Spengler, 2012. "Endogenising Detection in an Asymmetric Penalties Corruption Game," Discussion Papers 12/20, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Shidiqi, khalifany ash & Pradiptyo, rimawan, 2011. "A game theoretical analysis of economic sanction," MPRA Paper 30481, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.