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Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence

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  • George Tsebelis

Abstract

Two different models of the game between police and public, one with two-sided incomplete information and the other with multiple strategies, lead to the same results as my previous research: changes in penalties at equilibrium do not affect crime but instead affect police behavior. I compare these models with alternative models of the police-public game which come to different conclusions. I provide reasons for the differences in the conclusions, as well as empirical evidence against which the different models can be evaluated.

Suggested Citation

  • George Tsebelis, 1993. "Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(3), pages 349-374, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:349-374
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692893005003003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Irving Piliavin & Rosemary Gartner & Craig Thornton & Ross L. Matsueda, 1986. "Crime, Deterrence, and Rational Choice," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 108e576df4ff4e768e3b2bc8b, Mathematica Policy Research.
    2. Bianco, William T. & Ordeshook, Peter C. & Tsebelis, George, 1990. "Crime and Punishment: Are One-Shot, Two-Person Games Enough?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(2), pages 569-586, June.
    3. George Tsebelis, 1990. "Penalty has no Impact on Crime:," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(3), pages 255-286, July.
    4. Tsebelis, George, 1989. "The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 77-91, March.
    5. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 521-565, May-June.
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    Keywords

    crime; game theory; penalty;
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