Using laboratory experiments to study law and crime
AbstractThe 19th and 20th centuries produced breakthroughs in physics, chemistry, and the biological sciences. Laboratory research played an important role in the rapid advances made in these fields. Laboratory research can also contribute progress in the social sciences and, in particular, to law and criminology. To make this argument, we begin by discussing what laboratory experiments can and cannot do. We then provide three illustrations of lab experiments that have contributed to understanding of crime and law and discuss how these laboratory data complement those gained through other methods. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2013
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Quality & Quantity.
Volume (Year): 47 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/11135
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Francesco Guala, 2002. "On the scope of experiments in economics: comments on Siakantaris," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 261-267, March.
- Lance Lochner, 2005.
"Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System,"
2005 Meeting Papers
452, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Lance Lochner, 2007. "Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 444-460, March.
- Lance Lochner, 2003. "Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System," NBER Working Papers 9474, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2001.
"Professionals Play Minimax,"
2001-17, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Drago, Francesco & Galbiati, Roberto & Vertova, Pietro, 2007.
"The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati & Pietro Vertova, 2009. "The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(2), pages 257-280, 04.
- Drago, Francesco & Galbiati, Roberto & Vertova, Pietro, 2007. "The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 2912, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Ivar Krumpal & Heiko Rauhut & Dorothea Böhr & Elias Naumann, 2011. "The framing of risks and the communication of subjective probabilities for victimizations," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 45(6), pages 1331-1348, October.
- Moschini, GianCarlo, 2004.
"Nash Equilibrium in Strictly Competitive Games: Live Play in Soccer,"
Staff General Research Papers
12312, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Moschini, GianCarlo, 2004. "Nash equilibrium in strictly competitive games: live play in soccer," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 365-371, December.
- Shepherd, Joanna M, 2002. "Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California's Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 159-201, January.
- Kessler, Daniel P & Levitt, Steven D, 1999.
"Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 343-63, April.
- Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, 1998. "Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation," NBER Working Papers 6484, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- P.-A. Chiappori, 2002. "Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1138-1151, September.
- Heiko Rauhut & Marcel Junker, 2009. "Punishment Deters Crime Because Humans Are Bounded in Their Strategic Decision-Making," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 12(3), pages 1.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.