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The Theory of Implemetation when the Planner is a PLayer

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Author Info
Baliga, S.
Corchon, L.C.
Sjostrom, T.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 9512.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1995
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Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:9512

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Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm

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Related research
Keywords: GAME THEORY ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM

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  1. Roland Kirstein, . "Bayesian Monitoring," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2005-1-1132, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Voluntary Implementation," Working Papers 1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Pablo Amorós, 2003. "Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/27, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  5. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Active Courts and Menu Contracts," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-025, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information 9902003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1997. "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 9711003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Kala Krishna & Torben Tranaes, 1999. "Efficient Competition With Small Numbers -- With Applications to Privatisation and Mergers," NBER Working Papers 6952, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Repeated implementation and complexity considerations," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 271-293, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0410001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Sandro Brusco & Matthew O. Jackson, 1997. "The Optimal Design of a Market," Microeconomics 9711003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Shurojit Chatterji & Dragan Filipovich, 2004. "Ambiguous Contracting: Natural Language and Judicial Interpretation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 419, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  14. Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," ESE Discussion Papers 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  16. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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