The introduction of an appeals court in Dutch tax litigation
AbstractSince January 1, 2005, the Dutch tax litigation comprises an appeals court. Before 2005, it had but one court of instance. That means that now, after a court of first instance has given its verdict in a tax dispute, an unsatisfied party may appeal to a higher instance, where this was impossible before. In this paper we investigate which consequences introducing an appeals court has for the way tax payers and the tax administration solve their disputes. We focus on the following questions. Are more or less tax payers willing to go to court to solve the dispute? Is it more or less difficult for parties to agree upon a settlement? Which appeal rate can we expect? What is the role of trust in the courts in the answers to the questions above?
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2008.
Date of creation: 25 Apr 2006
Date of revision: 27 Apr 2006
Economic analysis of law; Litigation; Appeal;
Other versions of this item:
- Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A. & van Velthoven, Ben C.J., 2009. "The introduction of an appeals court in Dutch tax litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 13-24, March.
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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