Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Why Stare Decisis?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Anderlini, Luca
  • Felli, Leonardo
  • Riboni, Alessandro

Abstract

All Courts rule ex-post, after most economic decisions are sunk. This might generate a time-inconsistency problem. From an ex-ante perspective, Courts will have the (ex-post) temptation to be excessively lenient. This observation is at the root of the principle of stare decisis. Stare decisis forces Courts to weigh the benefits of leniency towards the current parties against the beneficial effects that tougher decisions have on future ones. We study these dynamics and find that stare decisis guarantees that precedents evolve towards ex-ante efficient decisions, thus alleviating the Courts’ time-inconsistency problem. However, the dynamics do not converge to full efficiency

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP8266.asp
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8266.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8266

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: Case Law; Precedents; Stare Decisis; Time-Inconsistency;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Scherer, F M, 1972. "Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 422-27, June.
  2. Gilat Levy, 2003. "Careerist Judges," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 457, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  3. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 191-219, October.
  4. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & A. Riboni, 2008. "Statute law or case law?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4433, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Anthony Niblett & Richard Posner & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "The Evolution of a Legal Rule," NBER Working Papers 13856, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, 2012. "A Theory of Rational Jurisprudence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(3), pages 513 - 551.
  7. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3593, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  8. Suzanne Scotchmer, 2006. "Innovation and Incentives," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262693437, December.
  9. Spitzer, Matt & Talley, Eric, 2000. "Judicial Auditing," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 649-83, June.
  10. Spier, Kathryn E, 1992. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 93-108, January.
  11. Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2002. "Courts, contracts and interference," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7034, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  12. Philip Bond, 2008. "Persistent Court Corruption," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1333-1353, 08.
  13. Christopher Phelan, 2001. "Public trust and government betrayal," Staff Report 283, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  14. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
  15. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  16. Gennaioli, Nicola & Shleifer, Andrei, 2007. "Overruling and the instability of law," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 309-328, June.
  17. Shavell, Steven, 1995. "The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 379-426, June.
  18. Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, 2008. "Case Law versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 379-430, 06.
  19. Álvaro Bustos, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Common Law Courts," Documentos de Trabajo 352, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  20. Phelan, Christopher, 2006. "Public trust and government betrayal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 27-43, September.
  21. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1999. "Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1-2), pages 158-89, Fall.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Immordino, Giovanni & Riboni, Alessandro, 2011. "Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 8433, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8266. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.