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Overruling and the instability of law

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Author Info
Gennaioli, Nicola
Shleifer, Andrei

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 309-328
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:35:y:2007:i:2:p:309-328

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2007. "The Evolution of Common Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 43-68. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Spiller, Pablo T & Tiller, Emerson H, 1997. "Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 347-70, June.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Guido Cozzi & Silvia Galli, 2009. "Upstream Innovation Protection: Common Law Evolution and the Dynamics of Wage Inequality," Working Papers 2009_20, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
  2. Guerriero, C., 2009. "Democracy, Judicial Attitudes and Heterogeneity: The Civil Versus Common Law Tradition," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0917, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-30.

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