Legal Change and the Social Value of Lawsuits
AbstractThis paper integrates the literatures on the social value of lawsuits, the evolution of the law, and judicial preferences to evaluate the hypothesis that the law evolves toward efficiency. The setting is a simple accident model with costly litigation where the efficient law minimizes the sum of accident plus litigation costs. In the steady state equilibrium, the distribution of legal rules is not necessarily efficient but instead depends on a combination of selective litigation, judicial bias, and precedent.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2008-34.
Date of creation: Sep 2008
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Efficiency of the law; judicial decision making; legal change; precedent; value of lawsuits;
Other versions of this item:
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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