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Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes

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  • Perloff, Jeffrey M
  • Rubinfeld, Daniel L
  • Ruud, Paul

Abstract

Risk aversion plays an important role in explaining why antitrust cases settle instead of going to trial. Using a jointly estimated model of settlement and trial outcome, the authors find that a one percent increase in the probability that the plaintiff wins at trial raises the probability of a settlement by 0.13 percent. They also find that reputation effects are not a significant factor for defendants, so the risk aversion of the defendants does not play a dominant role in determining whether the parties settle. Plaintiffs are more likely to win in certain jurisdictions, which encourages venue shopping by plaintiffs. Copyright 1996 by MIT Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Review of Economics & Statistics.

Volume (Year): 78 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 401-09

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Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:78:y:1996:i:3:p:401-09

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Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/

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Web: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journal-home.tcl?issn=00346535

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Cited by:
  1. Oliver Budzinski & Björn A. Kuchinke, 2012. "Deal or No Deal? Consensual Arrangements as an Instrument of European Competition Policy," Review of Economics, , , vol. 63(3), pages 265-292.
  2. Martin Carree & Andrea Günster & Maarten Schinkel, 2010. "European Antitrust Policy 1957–2004: An Analysis of Commission Decisions," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 97-131, March.
  3. Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl & Peter Grajzl & Katarina Zajc, 2014. "Inside Post-Socialist Courts: The Determinants of Adjudicatory Outcomes in Slovenian Commercial Disputes," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 4894, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Stiegert, Kyle W. & Hamilton, Stephen F., 1998. "Backward Implicit Contracts, Pre-Commitment And Market Power In The International Durum Wheat Market," 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) 20833, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  5. Hamilton, Stephen F. & Stiegert, Kyle W., 2002. "An empirical test of the rent-shifting hypothesis: the case of state trading enterprises," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 135-157, October.
  6. Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2004. "Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System," NBER Working Papers 10825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Deffains, Bruno & Lovat, Bruno, 2011. "The dynamics of the legal system," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 95-107, June.

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