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Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach

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  • Fournier, Gary M
  • Zuehlke, Thomas W

Abstract

Litigants in civil lawsuits involving monetary damages often find an out-of-court settlement preferable to a trial. Most theoretical models of settlement choice employ an expected-utility-maximizing framework that emphasizes the importance of risk preferences, litigation costs, and the distribution of trial awards. An empirical model of settlement choice is used to examine whether the variables prominent in the theoretical literature are statistically useful in explaining the occurrence and monetary value of settlements. Estimates from a sample of civil filings provide new empirical evidence of how the legal system affects the behavior of litigants during the settlement process. Copyright 1989 by MIT Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Review of Economics & Statistics.

Volume (Year): 71 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 189-95

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Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:71:y:1989:i:2:p:189-95

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Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/

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Web: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journal-home.tcl?issn=00346535

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Cited by:
  1. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 1997. "Stylized Facts of Patent Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership," NBER Working Papers 6297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2004. "Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System," NBER Working Papers 10825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Davis S. Kaplan & Joyce Sadka & Jorge Luis Silva-Mendez, 2006. "Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico," Working Papers, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM 0606, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  4. Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 1996. "Preliminary Injunctive Relief: Theory and Evidence from Patent Litigation," NBER Working Papers 5689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Beckner, Clinton III & Katz, Avery, 1995. "The incentive effects of litigation fee shifting when legal standards are uncertain," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 205-224, June.
  6. Schwab, Christian & Tang, Hin-Yue Benny, 2011. "Die Steuerungswirkungen unterschiedlicher Prozesskostenregelungen: Ein √úberblick zum Stand von Theorie und Empirie
    [The economic effects of alternative fee shifting rules: A review of the theoreti
    ," MPRA Paper 32746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Jean Olson Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 1998. "Stylised Fact of Patent Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE 20, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  8. Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick & Alexander Tabarrok, 2005. "Data Watch: Tort-uring the Data," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 207-220, Spring.
  9. Lanjouw, Jenny & Schankerman, Mark, 1998. "Patent Suits: Do They Distort Research Incentives?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl & Peter Grajzl & Katarina Zajc, 2014. "Inside Post-Socialist Courts: The Determinants of Adjudicatory Outcomes in Slovenian Commercial Disputes," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 4894, CESifo Group Munich.

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