Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence
AbstractThe conventional result of the theory of the public enforcement of law is that wrongful convictions of innocents are detrimental to deterrence. This proposition has been challenged recently. In some cases, wrongful convictions do not jeopardize deterrence, because they influence equally the innocent and the guilty. Therefore deterrence does not change. We show that, in general, wrongful convictions do lower deterrence. We prove that wrongful convictions do not jeopardize deterrence only in very limited circumstances or under unlikely assumptions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 168 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
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- Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2012.
"Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 311 - 338.
- Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2009. "Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 170, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2009.
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