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Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions

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Author Info
Posner, R.A.
Rasmusen, E.

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Abstract

Two central puzzles about social norms are now they are enforced and how they are created or modified. The sanctions for the violation of a norm can be categorized as automatic, guilt, shame, informational, bilateral-costly, and multilateral-costly. Problems in creating and modifying norms are related to which sanctions are employed. We use our analysis of enforcement and creation of norms to analyze the scope of feasible government action either to promote desirable norms or to repress undesirable ones.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research in its series Papers with number 98-005.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:indian:98-005

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Keywords: SOCIAL NORMS;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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  5. yamamura, eiji, 2007. "The effects of the social norm on cigarette consumption: evidence from Japan using panel data," MPRA Paper 10176, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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