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Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs

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  • Lu, Jingfeng
  • Ye, Lixin

Abstract

In auctions with private information acquisition costs, we completely characterize (socially) efficient and (revenue) optimal two-stage mechanisms, with the first stage being an entry right allocation mechanism and the second stage being a traditional private good provision mechanism. Both efficiency and revenue optimality require that the second-stage selling mechanism be ex post efficient and the number of entry slots be endogenously determined. We show that both efficient and optimal entry can be truthfully implemented in dominant strategies, and can also be implemented via all-pay, though not uniform-price or discriminatory-price, auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Lu, Jingfeng & Ye, Lixin, 2013. "Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 393-408.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:1:p:393-408
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vivek Bhattacharya & James W. Roberts & Andrew Sweeting, 2014. "Regulating bidder participation in auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 675-704, December.
    2. Sweeting, Andrew & Bhattacharya, Vivek, 2015. "Selective entry and auction design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 189-207.
    3. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2023. "Information acquisition and countervailing incentives," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    4. Xin Feng & Jingfeng Lu & Yeneng Sun, 2020. "Ex Ante Efficient Mechanism With Private Entry Costs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(3), pages 1531-1541, July.
    5. Xu, Xiaoshu & Levin, Dan & Ye, Lixin, 2013. "Auctions with entry and resale," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 92-105.
    6. Cristián Hernández & Daniel Quint & Christopher Turansick, 2020. "Estimation in English auctions with unobserved heterogeneity," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 868-904, September.
    7. Kirkegaard, René, 2022. "Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 234-239.
    8. Xiaogang Che & Tilman Klumpp, 2023. "Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 1207-1245, May.
    9. Chen, Jiafeng & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2021. "Auctioneers sometimes prefer entry fees to extra bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    10. Agastya, Murali & Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanisms; Auctions; Two-stage auctions; Information acquisition; Entry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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