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Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool

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  • McAdams, David

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 95 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 48-53

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:95:y:2007:i:1:p:48-53

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  1. Marco LiCalz & Alessandro Pavan, 2002. "Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition on Uniform-Price Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Ilan Kremer, 2004. "Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(3), pages 849-877.
  3. Ilan Kremer & Kjell G. Nyborg, 2004. "Divisible-Good Auctions: The Role of Allocation Rules," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 147-159, Spring.
  4. Umlauf, Steven R., 1993. "An empirical study of the Mexican Treasury bill auction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 313-340, June.
  5. Keloharju, Matti & Nyborg, Kjell G & Rydqvist, Kristian, 2002. "Strategic Behaviour and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F., 2001. "Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 29-34, October.
  7. Damianov, Damian S., 2005. "Erratum to "The uniform price auction with endogenous supply"," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 134-140, October.
  8. Damianov, Damian S., 2005. "The uniform price auction with endogenous supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 152-158, August.
  9. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November.
  10. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, 9.
  11. Yvan Lengwiler, 1998. "The multiple unit auction with variable supply," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 1998-28, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Damianov, Damian S. & Oechssler, Jörg & Becker, Johannes Gerd, 2010. "Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply - experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 60-76, January.
  2. Bourjade, Sylvain, 2009. "Strategic price discounting and rationing in uniform price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 23-27, October.
  3. Marco Pagnozzi, 2007. "Resale and Bundling in Auctions," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy 186, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  4. Hunt Allcott, 2012. "The Smart Grid, Entry, and Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets," NBER Working Papers 18071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Kwiek, Maksymilian, 2010. "Reputation in multi-unit ascending auction with common values," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1012, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  6. Kastl, Jakub, 2012. "On the properties of equilibria in private value divisible good auctions with constrained bidding," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 339-352.
  7. Damian S. Damianov & Johannes Gerd Becker, 2008. "Auctions with Variable Supply: Uniform Price versus Discriminatory," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/80, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  8. Peter Molnár, 2013. "Uniform price auctions with profit maximizing seller," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 1840-1846.
  9. Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx & David McAdams & Brian Murray, 2011. "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the United States," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 25-43, Winter.
  10. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2008. "A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 08tara, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2008.
  11. David McAdams & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie Marx & Brian Murray, . "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the U.S," Working Papers, Duke University, Department of Economics 10-64, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  12. Monostori, Zoltan, 2013. "Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók
    [Discriminatory versus uniform-price auctions]
    ," MPRA Paper 54254, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2013.
  13. Lu, Jingfeng & Ye, Lixin, 2013. "Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 393-408.
  14. Christian Ewerhart & Nuno Cassola & Natacha Valla, 2007. "Declining Valuations And Equilibrium Bidding In Central Bank Refinancing Operations," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute 07-22, Swiss Finance Institute.
  15. Harbord, David & Pagnozzi, Marco, 2014. "Britain's electricity capacity auctions: lessons from Colombia and New England," MPRA Paper 56224, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Song Han & Dan Li, 2010. "The fragility of discretionary liquidity provision - lessons from the collapse of the auction rate securities market," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 2010-50, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  17. Song Han & Dan Li, 2011. "The Fragility of Discretionary Liquidity Provision: Lessons from the Collapse of the Auction Rate Securities Market," Working Papers 052011, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.

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