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Learning from Financial Markets: Auctioning Tariff-Rate Quotas in Agricultural Trade

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Author Info
Robert Jörin
Yvan Lengwiler

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Abstract

Most tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) around the world are allocated in rather intransparent ways. Yet, according to the fundamental WTO principles, TRQs are supposed to be allocated in a transparent, equitable and non-discriminatory manner. We argue that auctions offer a promising way to achieve these goals, and at the same time enhance the efficiency of the allocation. Moreover, they provide the means to slowly phase out a quota regime in favor of a tariff-only regime. The biggest challenge in this endeavour is to find an auctioning procedure that operates also well in situations otherwise prone to collusive bidding behavior. We draw from experiences made in government debt auctions to come up with a system that would be resistant to collusion.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES) in its journal Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): 140 (2004)
Issue (Month): IV (December)
Pages: 521-541
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Handle: RePEc:ses:arsjes:2004-iv-3

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Related research
Keywords: Import Quotas; Auctions; Collusion; Treasury Bonds;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q17 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agriculture in International Trade
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

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  1. Stefan Tangermann, 1996. "Implementation Of The Uruguay Round Agreement On Agriculture: Issues And Prospects," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1-4), pages 315-337. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Daniel Heller & Yvan Lengwiler, 2001. "Should the Treasury Price Discriminate?. A Procedure for Computing Hypothetical Bid Functions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(3), pages 413-, September.
  3. Abdulai, Awudu, 2002. "Using Threshold Cointegration to Estimate Asymmetric Price Transmission in the Swiss Pork Market," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 34(6), pages 679-87, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2005. "An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 72(2), pages 567-592, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Tenorio, Rafael, 1993. "Revenue Equivalence and Bidding Behavior in a Multi-unit Auction Market: An Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(2), pages 302-14, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. repec:ccp:journl:v:1:y:2001:i:3:p:247-281 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. V.V. Chari & Robert J. Weber, 1992. "How the U.S. Treasury should auction its debt," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 3-12. [Downloadable!]
  8. Marco LiCalzi & Alessandro Pavan, 2002. "Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform- Price Auctions," Game Theory and Information 0210003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Umlauf, Steven R., 1993. "An empirical study of the Mexican Treasury bill auction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 313-340, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F., 2001. "Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 29-34, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Robert Alan Feldman & Vincent Reinhart, 1995. "Flexible Estimation of Demand Schedules and Revenue under Different Auction Formats," IMF Working Papers 95/116, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Ilan Kremer & Kjell G. Nyborg, 2004. "Divisible-Good Auctions: The Role of Allocation Rules," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 147-159, Spring.
  14. Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, 1993. " Treasury Auction Bids and the Salomon Squeeze," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1403-19, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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