We compare auction revenues from discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions in the case of the Korean treasury bonds auction market. For this purpose, we employ detailed bidder level data for each of 16 discriminatory auctions recently carried out in Korea. We first theoretically recover unobserved individual bidding functions under counter-factual uniform price auctions from the observed bidding functions under the actual discriminatory auctions, and then empirically estimate revenue differences. To test significance of the auction revenue differences, we use Bootstrap re-sampling methods where uncertainty in the cut-off yield spreads and uncertainty in the bidders are addressed individually as well as simultaneously. Our results indicate that uniform price auction increases the auction revenue relative to the discriminatory auction in most of the 16 cases, justifying the Korean government’s decision to switch to the uniform price auction mechanism in August 2000
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Microeconomic Data
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