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Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Matti Keloharju (Helsinki School of Economics)
Kjell G. Nyborg (London Business School and CEPR)
Kristian Rydqvist (Binghamton University and CEPR)
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We study uniform price auctions using a dataset which includes individual bidders' demand schedules in Finnish Treasury auctions during the period 1992-99. Average underpricing amounts to .041% of face value. Theory suggests that underpricing may result from monopsonistic market power. We develop and test robust implications from this theory and ¯nd that it has little support in the data. For example, bidders' individual demand functions do not respond to increased competition in the manner predicted by the theory. We also present evidence that the Finnish Treasury acts strategically, taking into account the fact that the auctions are part of a repeated game between the Treasury and the primary dealers. Empirically, the main driver behind bidder behavior and underpricing is the volatility of bond returns. Since there is no evidence that bidders are risk averse, this suggests that private information and the winner's curse may play an important role in these auctions.
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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number
2003.25.
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Date of creation: Mar 2003Date of revision:
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Keywords: Multiunit auctions ; uniform price auctions ; treasury auctions ; market power ; demand functions ; underpricing ; supply uncertainty ; seller behavior ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
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Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
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