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Mexican treasury securities primary auctions

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  • Sara Castellanos

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Theory workshop papers with number 357966000000000025.

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Date of creation: 04 Oct 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000025

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  1. Branch, Ben & Freed, Walter, 1977. "Bid-Asked Spreads on the Amex and the Big Board," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(1), pages 159-63, March.
  2. Nautz, D., 1995. "Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 301-306, June.
  3. Michael B. Gordy, 1997. "Hedging Winner's Curse with Multiple Bids: Evidence from the Portuguese Treasury Bill Auction," Microeconomics 9702002, EconWPA.
  4. Francis Breedon & Joe Ganley, 1996. "Bidding and Information: Evidence from Gilt-Edged Auctions," Bank of England working papers 42, Bank of England.
  5. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1997. "Auctioning Securities," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpas, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised Mar 1998.
  6. Yvan Lengwiler, 1999. "The multiple unit auction with variable supply," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 373-392.
  7. Haile,P.A., 1999. "Auctions with resale," Working papers 33, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  8. Sushil Bikhchandani & Chi-fu Huang, 1993. "The Economics of Treasury Securities Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 117-134, Summer.
  9. Amihud, Yakov & Mendelson, Haim, 1986. "Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 223-249, December.
  10. Peter Kennedy, 2003. "A Guide to Econometrics, 5th Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 5, volume 1, number 026261183x, December.
  11. Copeland, Thomas E & Galai, Dan, 1983. " Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(5), pages 1457-69, December.
  12. Nancy Harvey, 1999. "Recent Initiatives in the Canadian Market for Government of Canada Securities," Bank of Canada Review, Bank of Canada, vol. 1999(Summer), pages 27-35.
  13. Nautz, Dieter, 1997. "How Auctions Reveal Information: A Case Study on German REPO Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(1), pages 17-25, February.
  14. Robert Alan Feldman & Vincent Reinhart, 1995. "Auction Format Matters," IMF Working Papers 95/47, International Monetary Fund.
  15. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing," Papers of Peter Cramton 99wpvic, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 28 Jun 1999.
  16. Umlauf, Steven R., 1993. "An empirical study of the Mexican Treasury bill auction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 313-340, June.
  17. Nautz, D. & Wolfstetter, E., 1997. "Bid shading and risk aversion in multi-unit auctions with many bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 195-200, October.
  18. Haile, Philip A., 2003. "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 72-110, January.
  19. Carlo Cottarelli & Leonardo Bartolini, 1994. "Treasury Bill Auctions," IMF Working Papers 94/135, International Monetary Fund.
  20. Brennan, Michael J & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1998. "The Determinants of Average Trade Size," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71(1), pages 1-25, January.
  21. Saikat Nandi, 1997. "Treasury auctions: what do the recent models and results tell us?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 4, pages 4-15.
  22. Daniel Heller & Yvan Lengwiler, 1998. "The auctions of Swiss government bonds: should the Treasury price discriminate or not?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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Cited by:
  1. Walter Orellana & Bernardo Fernández & Vladimir Fernández, 2006. "Subasta electrónica interactiva y subasta a sobre cerrado: un análisis comparativo de los resultados en Bolivia," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(3), pages 299-345, julio-sep.
  2. Pamela Cardozo, 2013. "Bidders’ Behaviour in Government Securities Auctions: A case study for Colombia," Borradores de Economia 760, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  3. Erwann Sba� & Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Estimation and comparison of treasury auction formats when bidders are asymmetric," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 745-779.
  4. Pamela Cardozo, 2013. "Bidders´ Behaviour in Government Securities Auctions: A case study for Colombia," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 010501, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.

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